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Abstract
Miscommunication is a neglected issue in the cognitive sciences, where it has often been dis-
counted as noise in the system. This special issue argues for the opposite view: Miscommunication is
a highly structured and ubiquitous feature of human interaction that systematically underpins peo-
ple’s ability to create and maintain shared languages. Contributions from conversation analysis, com-
putational linguistics, experimental psychology, and formal semantics provide evidence for these
claims. They highlight the multi-modal, multi-person character of miscommunication. They demon-
strate the incremental, contingent, and locally adaptive nature of the processes people use to detect
and deal with miscommunication. They show how these processes can drive language change. In
doing so, these contributions introduce an alternative perspective on what successful communication
is, new methods for studying it, and application areas where these ideas have a particular impact. We
conclude that miscommunication is not noise but essential to the productive flexibility of human
communication, especially our ability to respond constructively to new people and new situations.
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1. Introduction
Although miscommunication has been the subject of significant attention in sociolin-
guistics, discourse analysis, and social psychology (see e.g., Coupland, Giles, & Wie-
mann, 1991), it has received much less attention in the cognitive sciences. Studies of
identity, power, ideology, and social structure often see moments of miscommunication
as an important window on people’s assumptions about norms of behavior and an oppor-
tunity to expose the processes through which cultures are reproduced (Coupland, Wie-
mann, & Giles, 1991; Garfinkel, 1967). The ambitions of this special issue are
substantially parallel to this work but more restricted in scope.
The starting point for this collection of papers is the idea that miscommunication offers
the cognitive sciences a productive window on the representations and processes required
to explain the mutual-intelligibility of human interaction. Together, the papers demon-
strate four areas in which a focus on miscommunication has the potential to make
substantive new contributions to cognitive science:
1. An expansion of the range of experimental and computational techniques available
for studying interaction.
2. Development of new formal, computational, and empirical models of interaction.
3. New applications built on the recognition of miscommunication as a ubiquitous
phenomenon.
4. A re-examination of foundational concepts such as representation, meaning, and un-
derstanding.
The significance of these contributions depends, in part, on their place in the wider
context of work on communication in the cognitive sciences and their potential to extend
this work into new areas.
2. The cognitive science of communication
With some notable exceptions (discussed below), communication has often been trea-
ted as a secondary research issue in the cognitive sciences. One reason for this is that the
salient unit of analysis for cognitive science is the individual, or the individual’s brain,
and this naturally tends to foreground intra-individual processes at the expense of extra-
individual processes including communication. This general tendency has, of course, been
subject to criticism even within cognitive science (e.g., Clark, 2008; Hutchins, 1995).
Communication is also an ambiguous term. People sometimes speak of music as a
powerful medium of communication but are only referring to the processes of composi-
tion or performance. Similarly, in contexts like advertising and politics, communication
sometimes refers solely to the process of producing and distributing a message or image.
This sense of communication implies that there is nothing much of significance beyond
the processes involved in production for what is, by implication, a generic, passive
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audience. Miscommunication, on the other hand, is an inherently multi-person phe-
nomenon that is defined by the inter-relationship between what people produce and their
audience’s reactions.
This brings the interactive processes characteristic of face-to-face conversation into
focus and a practical reason why communication has received less attention: the method-
ological difficulties that it creates. Natural interaction is typically multi-party, fragmented,
multi-modal, and highly context sensitive. It is difficult to achieve adequate levels of
experimental control in a live conversation and difficult to collect many of the response
measures that interest cognitive scientists, for example, concurrent measures of neural
activity. It is significantly easier to study how individuals process single words or
sentences alone in a laboratory than it is to study language use in conversation.
A more deep-seated, historical reason for the relative paucity of work on communica-
tion is the idea that natural languages have a structure that should be primarily under-
stood as a computational system adapted for reasoning with only a secondary use in
interaction (e.g., Chomsky 1986; Fodor, 1975). This idea is not universally accepted, not
least because natural languages seem better adapted to interaction than to computation
(Pinker & Bloom, 1990). However, following Chomsky (1965), it became accepted prac-
tice to study language competence abstracted away from the details of communicative
performance. On this view, phenomena like miscommunication are paradigmatic exam-
ples of data that fall outside the scope of explanation. Whether or not they agreed with
Chomsky, many landmark developments in formal semantics (e.g., Montague, 1974) and
computational grammars (e.g., Gazdar, Klein, Pullum, & Sag, 1985) also idealized away
from communicative use.
Despite this reticence, there are many examples of work on human interaction that
illustrate a productive interplay between philosophical, experimental, computational, and
formal approaches to understanding communication in the cognitive sciences. Bartlett’s
experimental comparison of memory during free recall with memory during re-telling in
conversation provides an early reference point in experimental psychology (Bartlett,
1932). Despite not working on interaction himself, Turing’s (1950) proposal that
unscripted conversation is the key test of machine intelligence gave interaction an endur-
ing significance in cognitive science and helped launch the careers of many famous artifi-
cial conversational agents (e.g., Eliza, the artificial Rogerian therapist built by
Weizenbaum, 1966).
One of the first attempts to produce a general, systematic theory of human communica-
tion emerged from the Palo Alto group in the 1960s (Watzlawick, Bavelas, & Jackson,
1967). Inspired by fine-grained analyses of the conduct of psychiatric interviews, they
explored a combination of psychological theory and cybernetic principles of interactive
feedback as a route to developing better therapeutic and computational applications. The
same studies that inspired Watzlawick et al. (1967) also launched a substantial strand of
observational (e.g., Kendon, 1980, 1990; McNeill, 1985, 1992) and later experimental
(e.g., Bavelas, Chovil, Lawrie, & Wade, 1992) work on the fine-grained choreography of
gesture and body movements in interaction, in turn, feeding the development of artificial
embodied conversational agents (e.g., Cassell, 2000).
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Influential lines of work also emerged from analytic philosophy. Lewis (1969) built on
Schelling’s game-theoretic ideas to produce an influential analysis of languages as con-
ventional solutions to coordination problems. Austin’s (1962) concept of language as
action inspired attempts to build formal models of conversational “speech acts” (Searle,
1969). Grice’s introduction of a principled distinction between what people literally say
in conversation and what they imply by what they say provided impetus for intention
based formal approaches to modeling conversation (Grice, 1975; Sperber & Wilson,
1986). These developments in formal semantics and pragmatics in turn prompted new
lines of investigation in experimental psychology and in computational modeling of inter-
action (see, e.g., Cohen, Morgan, & Pollack, 1990).
A particularly important contribution in experimental psychology was the development
of a definite reference task that provided a simple objective measure of how well a con-
versation was going (Krauss & Weinheimer, 1966). This initiated a program of experi-
mental investigation that continues in contemporary psycholinguistics. It created the key
experimental paradigm which, together with Lewisian and Gricean influences, provided
the foundations for the influential Collaborative Model of dialog, which emphasizes the
interactive, collaborative processes people use to build up mutual-understanding, or
common ground in conversation (Clark, 1996).
This necessarily incomplete sketch illustrates the importance of human communication,
and more specifically interaction, as a long-standing interest in the cognitive sciences.
The papers in this special issue continue this tradition and review many more recent
developments. However, probably the most important omission above is older: the mathe-
matical theory of information (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). This work is an especially use-
ful reference point for clarifying what is at issue in the contrast between communication
and miscommunication as issues for cognitive science.
2.1. A definition of communication and miscommunication
Originally developed in 1948, the mathematical model of communication was immedi-
ately identified as a promising model of human interaction with the potential to apply not
just to the analysis of speech communication but all human interaction (Shannon & Wea-
ver, 1949). In the original formulation, communication was modeled as illustrated in
Fig. 1. An information source selects a message from some known set of alternatives, for
example, words of English, and the transmitter converts these words into a signal, for
example, into vibrations of the air produced by a voice. The receiver then decodes the
signal to recover the transmitted word. Shannon’s innovation was to model the informa-
tion transmitted by a signal through a channel in terms of the total set of alternative pos-
sible messages that could be transmitted through that channel. This enabled a new
mathematical characterization of the amount of information transmitted by a given
message, the capacity of an information channel, and the effects of noise on the channel.
Fig. 1 thus provides a clear picture of what successful communication is and of what
can go wrong with it. Shannon’s model was principally concerned with the “technical
problem” of modeling information transmission in terms of the statistical rarity of a
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signal. Weaver proposed that it also applied to the “semantic problem” of how a signal
conveys a desired meaning and the “effectiveness problem” of how the transmitted mean-
ing then impacts on behavior. The criterion of communicative success at the semantic
level was “the identity, or satisfactorily close approximation, in the interpretation of
meaning by the receiver, as compared with the intended meaning of the sender” (Shannon
& Weaver, 1949, p. 4). Communication between people is thus successful only if the
cognitive states corresponding to the speaker’s and hearer’s interpretations are identical,
or close enough to identical as to make no substantive difference. Furthermore, the cogni-
tive processes corresponding to message encoding and decoding need to guarantee that
the hearer is “a sort of inverse” of the speaker (Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p. 7). Miscom-
munication, on the other hand, is modeled as “noise” or perturbations in the channel
which alter the transmission of the signal leading to uncertainty about, for example, what
words were actually said or what gestures were actually performed.
This analysis of communication and its definition of communicative success is one of
the most important models in the cognitive sciences. Among other things, the work of
Shannon was important in the cybernetic feedback theories that influenced Watzlawick
et al. (1967). Cherry (1957) provides an early review of its applications to human commu-
nication as well as early warnings about the difficulties with using statistical information
theory to explain semantic coordination: Equally rare messages can be informationally
equivalent while meaning quite different things. Nonetheless, it provides a clear picture of
the relationship between syntactic and semantic representations of natural languages as
codes, cognitive processes as encoding–decoding mechanisms that implement these codes,
and of communication as the process of using signals to align processing at the source and
receiver. As noted above, many theories of the formal and computational structure of natu-
ral languages adopted essentially the same idealization. Some work makes the relationship
with the code-model explicit. For example, Sperber and Wilson (1986) adopted the code-
model conception of the transmission of literal meaning as a necessary condition for com-
munication and then enriched it with the pragmatic inferences required to derive
Fig. 1. The basic information-theoretic model of a communication system (from Shannon &Weaver, 1949, p. 7).
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implications. A similar assumption is incorporated into the Interactive Alignment model,
which assumes parity between people’s encoding and decoding processes over the same
phonological, syntactic, and semantic representations as underpinning successful commu-
nication (Garrod & Pickering, 2009; Pickering & Garrod, 2004).
The problem with this picture is the limited analysis of miscommunication it provides.
The only kind of communication problem systematically captured in the Shannon–Wea-
ver picture is “mishearing” in which transmission of a signal is threatened by, for exam-
ple, background noise. What this does not accommodate is situations in which people do
not share the same code(s), that is, do not understand the same thing by an utterance or
gesture. Weaver’s qualification that interpretations only need to be “satisfactorily close”
covers differences in interpretation that are too insignificant to impact on the conduct of
the interaction. What it does not cover are situations where a problem with interpretation
is detected and addressed in the conversation, for example, through a clarification ques-
tion (Purver, Ginzburg, & Healey, 2003). It also fails to cover the situation in which peo-
ple do, ostensibly, share the same code but the signal underspecifies the meaning, that is,
where the signal to meaning mapping is not 1-to-1.1 What is the evidence that
miscommunication of this kind is important?
3. The cognitive science of miscommunication
Two basic questions for cognitive science are raised by the preceding discussion. First,
does miscommunication really amount to something more substantive than noise in the
system? Second, if it does, what implications does this have for our understanding of
what communication really is?
As noted above, the empirical question of what happens when people encounter differ-
ences in interpretation during conversation has often been avoided as a “performance”
issue in cognitive science. Nonetheless, some experimental studies have directly manipu-
lated differences in understanding in order to explore their effects on communicative coor-
dination (e.g., Anderson et al., 1991; Healey, 1997; Isaacs & Clark, 1987; Metzing &
Brennan, 2003). However, the most developed empirical account of what happens when
things go wrong comes from conversation analysis (CA), a sociological tradition built on
detailed qualitative analyses of natural interaction (Sacks, 1992). For reasons that are
explored further below, the relationship between conversation analysis and cognitive
science is not straightforward (see also De Ruiter & Albert, 2017; and the discussion by
Albert & de Ruiter, 2018) but it has had a significant influence on work in mainstream
cognitive science (viz: Clark & Marshall, 1981; Levelt, 1989; Levinson, 2002; Hutchins,
1995; Healey, 2008) and is a key reference point for all the papers in this volume.
3.1. Conversation analysis and repair
The procedures people use to deal with potential troubles in ordinary conversation
were among the first generalizations made by conversation analysts. Troubles in the CA
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sense are more diverse than noise, and include misarticulations, malapropisms, use of a
“wrong” word, unavailability of a word when needed, and trouble on the part of the
recipient in understanding (Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977). Conversation analysts
have provided detailed descriptions of the procedures people use to diagnose and repair
these difficulties (Jefferson, 1983; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, 1987,
1992). These mechanisms are organized in terms of structural relationships between
sequences of turns and turn constituents and, it is claimed, are independent of the type of
problem encountered. They are primarily analyzed in terms of where in the sequence of
turns in a conversation trouble is signaled, who (nominally) produced the source of the
trouble, who responded to it, and where in the sequence it is resolved. Albert and de Rui-
ter (2018) and Purver, Hough, and Howes (2018) provide examples and further explana-
tion of these structures.
What are the prospects for a cognitive science of miscommunication? There are several
points of contact between the CA analysis of repair and cognitive science. The fact that
repair sequences are both incremental and jointly managed highlights the fundamentally
interactive nature of these processes (see Byun, De Vos, Bradford, U., & Levinson, 2018;
McCabe & Healey, 2018; Purver et al., 2018). This creates particular difficulties for sen-
tential approaches to the formal semantics of dialog and alternative approaches, inspired
by a consideration of patterns of misunderstanding, are also explored in Ginzburg and
Kolliakou (2018) and Larsson (2018).
CA repair mechanisms are unusual in that they appear to operate in any conversational
context and are considered to be “the only type of turn with unrestricted privilege of
occurrence” (Schegloff, 1993, p. 115). Although quantification has sometimes been
resisted in CA, estimates of the frequency of repair in cognitive science support the claim
that it is ubiquitous with around one repair event every 20 words, or roughly once every
three turns in ordinary conversation (Brennan & Schober, 2001; Colman & Healey,
2011). Enfield (2017) recently estimated that specific, explicit repair initiations like
“Huh?” or “Who?” occur on average once every 84 seconds in ordinary conversation.
Quantitative results also indicate that repair types are not, as CA analyses originally
suggested, independent of context or problem type. Rates of repair approximately double
when people are engaged in a task that demands high levels of coordination and the dis-
tribution of repair types also changes (Colman & Healey, 2011). Specific repair types are
associated with specific problem types (Purver et al., 2003) and patterns of repair also
vary systematically with factors such as age and gender (Bortfeld, Leon, Bloom, Schober,
& Brennan, 2001). Purver et al. (2018) provide further quantitative estimates of repair
frequencies and show how they also vary between corpora collected under different con-
ditions and, perhaps more obviously, with the quality of the transcriptions which often
involve some normalization of the original speech. This makes it likely that the current
quantitative estimates underestimate the frequency of repairs.
Repair is not just frequent; evidence is accumulating that at least some of the mecha-
nisms involved are universal across human languages (Dingemanse, Torreira, & Enfield,
2013; Dingemanse et al., 2015). It also appears that some of these mechanisms generalize
across modalities with evidence of specialized visual repair devices used in
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communication mediated by gesture or sign language (e.g., Manrique & Enfield, 2015;
Mortensen, 2012). Byun et al. (2018) review some of this work and also show how basic
repair procedures are of critical importance for signers in situations where people do not
have a common sign language. Similarly, in experiments in which people communicate
solely by drawing, Healey, Swoboda, Umata, and King (2007) identified graphical ana-
logs of repair mechanisms that appear to play a key role in people’s ability to create and
coordinate invented graphical languages.
Although CA characterizes repairs as local operations on the surface structure of a con-
versation, there is experimental evidence that repairs have subterranean effects that go
beyond the local detection and resolution of troubles. For example, Jefferson (1983)
described forms of embedded correction in which people repeat part of a turn with a
word or phrase substituted without any overt signal of a problem.2 Experimental work
has shown substitutions of this kind appear to be a powerful mechanism for word acquisi-
tion by children and may be more effective than explicit correction (Chouinard & Clark,
2003; Saxton, 1997). In adult interactions, Brennan and Schober (2001) showed that self-
repairs in which people revise what they are saying mid-turn, often termed “disfluencies”
in linguistics, can demonstrably add to the intelligibility of speaker’s turns for their
addressees. McCabe and Healey (2018) provide further evidence for the beneficial effect
of the use of self-repairs by mental health professionals on the quality of clinical interac-
tions. In addition, there is experimental evidence that selectively interfering with specific
repair mechanisms can speed up or slow down semantic coordination in dialog (see e.g.,
Healey, 2008; Healey, Mills, Eshghi, & Howes, 2018).
Returning to the question posed at the start of this section, it appears that there is a
strong case for claiming that people encounter problems with communication frequently,
that these problems display a variety and complexity that goes considerably beyond signal
noise, and that the processes for dealing with them involve specialized devices that have
a systematic impact on subsequent coordination.
This is a substantial departure from Shannon and Weaver’s picture and a significant
challenge to some contemporary theories of communication. For example, psycholingusis-
tic models that try to model conversation as primarily an egocentric process (Barr & Key-
sar, 2002; Horton & Gerrig, 2005; Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar, 2007; Keysar, Barr,
& Horton, 1998) or rely on mechanisms such as mutual-priming (Pickering & Garrod,
2004, 2006) rapid autonomous prediction (Pickering & Garrod, 2013) or automatic “mir-
roring” and “resonance” (Iacoboni, 2009) all focus on explaining interactions in situtations
in which processing does not diverge in significant ways between different participants.
However, differences in processing appear to be ubiquitous in natural conversation and
adjusting to differences in understanding looks more like the rule than the exception. The
assumption that “adults routinely process language egocentrically, adjusting to the other’s
perspective only when they make an error” (Keysar et al., 1998, p. 46) becomes analo-
gous to claiming that drivers routinely drive in a straight line, steering only when there is
a curve in the road.
At a minimum, cognitive science needs a much richer conception of the mechanisms
people use to detect and deal with miscommunication. The preceding discussion and the
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collection of papers in this volume suggest this is achievable and that the mixed methods
and disciplines of the cognitive sciences can make a productive contribution with poten-
tially important practical applications (see e.g., McCabe & Healey, 2018; Schober, Suess-
brick, & Conrad, 2018).
3.2. Communication and miscommunication
This leads to the second and more fundamental question posed above: What implica-
tions does this have for our understanding of what communication really is? Conversation
analysis has a distinctive answer to this question. Garfinkel (1967) rejected the idea that
shared understanding should be analyzed in terms of matching mental states of the kind
incorporated into Shannon and Weaver’s picture. Instead, Garfinkel argued that shared
understanding should be understood as a practical achievement and analyzed in terms of
the everyday procedures, like repair, that people use to decide if they understand each
other: “The appropriate image of a common understanding is [. . .] of an operation rather
that a common intersection of overlapping sets” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 30). This rejection
of questions about identity of meaning in favor of empirical analysis of the processes
people use to settle questions of meaning is echoed by Schegloff:
[. . .] intersubjectivity is not a matter of a generalized intersection of beliefs or knowl-
edge or procedures for generating them. Nor does it arise as “a problem of intersubjec-
tivity.” Rather, particular aspects of particular bits of conduct that compose the warp
and weft of ordinary social life provide occasions and resources for understanding,
which can also issue in problematic understandings. (Schegloff, 1992, p. 1299)
These remarks highlight how the promising empirical bridges between cognitive
science and CA are built on different conceptual foundations, especially with respect to
what shared meaning and understanding really are. The practical, procedural answer given
by CA has the advantage that it turns an “in principle” problem about the possibility of
communication into a practical empirical question about what people actually do. How-
ever, it also runs into two problems about meaning that have been important in cognitive
science.
First, Garfinkel’s commitment to uncovering how people actually produce social order
translates to a methodological commitment in CA that only things which participants
themselves orient to as relevant for interaction should be used to explain interaction. As a
result, miscommunication is only miscommunication if it is recognized and dealt with as
such by participants themselves. However, this makes some intuitions about referential
meaning difficult to accommodate. Frege’s (1892) distinction between sense and reference
was designed to capture situations in which people are mistaken about what they are
referring to. So, for example, two people might believe they are referring to the same
thing, even though to a third-party they are not. The participants might never discover
the mismatch, and it might not have any consequences for the interaction. Nonetheless, it
seems odd to argue that there is therefore no miscommunication in this situation. There is
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a strong intuition that the participants meant something different when they made their
references even if they were not aware of it (see also, e.g., Putnam, 1975).
The second problem is due to the emphasis on local in-the-moment co-production of
understanding: “The defense of intersubjectivity is locally managed, locally adapted and
recipient designed” (Schegloff, 1992, p. 1338, original emphasis). Taken at face value,
this implies that communication (or miscommunication) is a purely local matter. As
noted above, Schegloff explicitly discounts the role of knowledge in explaining how
mutual understanding is produced, but this begs the question of how people are able to
engage in these processes at all. What cognitive or neural resources do people need to
bring to a conversation in order to be able to perform repair? Their knowledge, how-
ever incomplete, of the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of a language, seems highly
relevant to how they actually go about repairs (see e.g., Byun et al., 2018). People’s
ability to engage in repair appears to be continuous with other aspects of their knowl-
edge of language and this seems to demand explanation in terms of some form of non-
local, transferable knowledge, a point also developed by Ginzburg and Kolliakou
(2018).
3.3. Communication is miscommunication?
How can we connect these dots? The problem for theories of interaction has tradition-
ally been understood as communication is possible, how can we explain this? The default
answer has been to reason from the fact that we can communicate to the conclusion that
something—concepts, contents, ideas, senses, codes—must be shared. In cognitive
science, this naturally becomes the hypothesis that what is shared is “in the head” and
that we need to define some equivalence in cognitive representations or brain states to
explain equivalence of meaning.
This special issue invites a different way of framing the problem. Miscommunication is
possible, how can we explain this? In practice, we do not seem to require that people
have the same interpretation of what words mean in order to be able to use them success-
fully; people normally discount differences in interpretation in ordinary conversation (Put-
nam, 1988). As Fodor and Lepore note, it seems to be a “patent truth that no two
speakers of the same language ever speak exactly the same dialect of that language”
(Fodor & Lepore, 1992, p. 10). What this amounts to is the possibility that we never actu-
ally satisfy the shared code picture of communication. Moreover, even if our mental rep-
resentations of a word happen to be “sufficiently similar,” this might not be enough to
determine sameness of meaning. What a word means seems to depend partly on facts
about the world and partly on facts about the practices of our speech communities, neither
of which has to be encoded in anybody’s head (e.g., Burge, 1979, 1986; Putnam, 1975).
Miscommunication can provide us with an alternative set of foundations for interaction
that defuses these difficulties. Like Garfinkel, we can abandon the idea that sameness of
meaning depends on sameness of mental states. We can substitute identity criteria for
meaning based on internal cognitive representations with criteria based on observable
behavior in interaction. As a result, sameness of meaning is defined by what actually
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happens in particular encounters between particular people and is indexed to the physical
and social environment of the interaction, that is the specific problems encountered, the
specific things talked about, and the specific practices of the relevant speech communities.
Importantly, this does not entail that mental representations or brain states are irrelevant
for communication. They retain their causal role—anyone trying to build a machine that
communicates has to put something “in the head” of the machine, that is, endow it with
representations and processes that enable it to engage in interaction. Rather, as McDowell
and Pettit (1986) put it, the point is that it may be that what is in the head bears no con-
stitutive relevance to questions of sameness of meaning.
All this might seem to be too much of a concession for cognitive science and the idea
that meanings are not, ultimately, reducible to mental states can seem highly counter-
intuitive. However, it preserves some important intuitions. It maintains the causal rele-
vance of cognitive and brain states to our ability to interact. It also maintains a systematic
connection between what happens in interaction to patterns of individual and communal
language use. Whenever we encounter a problem in communication, we can use the
structured processes of repair to update our (partial and contingent) understanding of what
words mean and adjust to different people and different patterns of use. As a result, it
maintains the possibility of a naturalized theory of meaning.
What changes is our concept of what successful communication really is and the idea
that shared codes should play any role in explaining how it works. Instead of assuming
communication is underwritten by shared languages encoded in “sufficiently similar” men-
tal representations, shared languages become an emergent and constantly evolving product
of interaction. Instead of thinking of effective communication as formulating a “perfect”
message, it becomes about finding optimal ways to uncover and address misunderstandings
(cf. Reddy, 1979). This helps to guarantee the flexibility of natural languages and under-
write our ability to adapt them to new people and new situations. The viability of this pro-
gram consists in whether it suggests new lines of research and opens up new areas of
application. The papers gathered in this volume provide some encouraging signposts.
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2. It is sometimes argued this is not strictly a repair because it is not presented as
explicit or exposed, but we gloss over this distinction here.
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